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The mere fact that a party acts on the advice of an attorney in suing
out a search warrant, does not absolutely show absence of malice, and
probable cause, espedally where, in communicating the facts to the
attorney, he so enlarges a mere suspicion as to make it appear that he
has some positive information. In such a case the advice of the attorney
is no defence.
ADVICE

OF COUNSEL AS A DEFENCE TO A SUIT FOR
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

I. The action for malicious prosecution depends upon the
two conditions, usually interdependent, of malice and want of
probable cause; in other words, the defendant must have
instituted the proceeding out of which the suit grew from a
bad motive, and have had no reason to believe the plaintiff
guilty of the offence charged. These two conditions must, as
a general rule, co-exist. If there was really good ground to
believe the plaintiff guilty, the motive of the defendant in
prosecuting is immaterial ; and, on the other -hand, if he had
no valid reason to believe in his guilt, the very purest motive
ought not to relieve him from liability for negligence, if for
nothing else. As a matter of fact, malice is much more
frequently inferred from the want of probable cause than
proven b y direct evidence. It follows, then, that anything
which tends to disprove malice or to show probable cause is,
or ought to be, admissible in evidence, in the one instance to
mitigate damages, in the other to exonerate from all liability.
IReported in 37 N. E . Rep. 593.
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II. In all matters involving legal questions, the opinion of
an attorney is necessarily of great and controlling weight;
and, therefore, when he pronounces it as his opinion on a
given state of facts that they warrant a criminal prosecution,
and that is set on foot, it is only fair to infer that the prosecution would not have been begun without that opinion.. The
opinion, then, is really the efficient cause of the suit; and the
prosecutor, who has acted according to his best lights, ought
not justly to be held liable. The general rule, therefore, is, that
the advice of an attorney is admissible in evidence to disprove
malice and establish probable cause; and, if connected with
perfect good faith on the part of the prosecutor, will exonerate
him from all liability: Miller v. Chic., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
41 Fed. Rep. 898; Wicker v. Hotchkiss, 62 Ill. 107; Walker v.
Camp, 69 Iowa, 74i; Acton v. Coffman, 74 Iowa, 17;
Soule v. Winslow, 66 Me. 447; Perry v. Sulier, 92 Mich. 72;
S. C., 52 N. W. Rep. 8oi; Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn. 182;
Jonasen v. Kennedy (Neb.), 58 N. W. Rep. 122; Bartlett v.
Brown, 6 R. I. 37; Newton v. Weaver, 13 R. I. 616. The
attorney should be competent to give the advice sought; or
at least the defendant should have no reason to suspect him
of incompetency: Schippel v. Norton, 38 Kans. 567; and
should be a man of integrity: Walter v. Sample, 25 Pa. 275.
It would be monstrous to hold that anyone, by applying to aweak man, or an ignorant one, might shelter his malice in
bringing an unfounded prosecution: Hewlett v. Cruchley,
5 Taunt. 277. But it is sufficient that he be reputed competent in the community in which he lives: Murphy v. Larson, 77 Ill. 172. If he is a regularly licensed attorney, his
competency will be presumed, and the defendant need not
adduce proof thereof: Home v. Sullivan, 83 Ill. 30. He
must also be one whom defendant had no reason to suspect
of prejudice or bias: Smith v. King, 62 Conn. 515 ; S. C.,
26 Atl. Rep. io59. If he is interested in the subject matter
of the prosecution, and defendant have knowledge of it, his
advice will be no defence, though it be given honestly, for the
defendant in such a case has no right to expect an unbiased
opinion: White v. Carr, 71 Me. 555.
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The rule applies to advice given by a district, county, or
prosecuting attorney, equally with private counsel: Jessup v.
Whitehead (Colo.), 29 Pac. Rep. 916; Wright v. Hanna,
;8 Ind. 217; Thurston v. Wright, 77 Mich. 96; Huntingdon v. Gault, 81 Mich. 144; S. C., 45 N. W. Rep. 970;
Webster v. Fowler, 89 Mich. 303; S. C., 5o N. W. Rep.
1074;

Norrell v. Vogel, 39 Minn. 107;

S. C., 38 N. W.

Rep. 705; Baldwin v. Weed, 17 Wend. 224; Laughlin
v. Clauson, 27 Pa. 328. It has been claimed that the
rule should apply more strongly to these than to private
counsel, on account of their official character, and that their
advice should be a complete defence; but this was rejected by
the court on unassailable grounds. "Prosecuting officers in
this county do not stand on a higher plane of learning or
ability than their brethren of the profession who do not hold
office; nor are they held in higher esteem for honor or integrity of purpose. If this be true (and it certainly cannot be
doubted), there is no good reason why the advice of a county
or distinct attorney should be treated as a more effective
shield than that of the private lawyer, who is also an officer of
court, and entitled to its confidence and respect:" Sebastian
v. Cheney (Tex.), 24 S. W. Rep. 970. It might also have
been added that there were powerful reasons why it should
have even less effect: that the ablest members of the Bar would
not accept the office of district attorney except in the large
cities; that even there, as in all other places, the office was
liable to become the prey of professional politicians; anhd that
in many places it is given to men of youth, and inexperience,
as a means to help them rise in their profesgion..
The person whose advice is sought must be an attorney;
and if he is not, his advice will be of no avail. The fact that
he held himself out as an attorney, and that the defendant
believed him to be such, does not alter the case: Murphy v.
Larson, 77 Ill. 172. No person unlearned in the law is competent to give such advice; and consequently the advice of a
pettifogger, who has been for years engaged in suits before
justices, is no defence, as there is no presumption that he knows
more than other laymen: Stanton v. Hart, 27 Mich. 539.
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The same is true of the advice of a police officer: Coleman v.
Heurich, 2 Mackey (D. C.), 189; and of a detective: Breitmesser v. Stier, 13 Phila. 8o.
There is, however, some little difference of opinion on the
question of the effect in this regard of advice given by a
justice of the peace or magistrate. The vast preponderance
of authority gives it the same status as any other lay advice,
and declares it to be no defence: Rigden v. Jordan, 81 Ga. 668;
Finn v. Frink, 84 Me. 261; S. C., 24 Atl. Rep. 851; Straus
v. Young, 36 Md. 246; Olmstead v. Partridge, 82 Mass. 381;
Cooney v. Chase, 81 Mich. 203; S. C., 45 N. W. Rep. 833;
Brobst v. Ruff, IOO Pa. 91; Beihofer v. Loeffert (Pa.), 28 Atl.
Rep. 217; Sutton v. McConnell, 46 Wis. 269; S. C., 50 N.
W. Rep. 414; Burgett v. Burgett, 43 Ind. 78; Williams v.
Van Meter, 8 Mo. 339; Gee v. Culver, 12 Ore. 228.

"Jus-

tices of the peace are not required to be learned in the law.
In fact, generally throughout the State they are not. They
are not qualified by a course of study to give advice on questions of law. They do not pursue it as a profession. They
are not charged with the duty of advising any person to commence a prosecution. They ought not to act as attorney or
agent for one in regard to a prosecution he is about to institute before them.

.

.

.

An educated business man may be

much better qualified than many inexperienced justices of the
peace to advise as to the law; yet I am not aware that the
advice of such a-person has ever been held to protect against
damages for a malicious prosecution:" Brobst v. Ruff, supra.
On the other side are Holmes v. Horger (Mich.), 56 N. W.
Rep. 3, which does not mention Cooney v. Chase, 81 Mich.
2b03, which it seems to overrule; Thomas v. Painter, IO Phila.
409, practically overruled by Brobst v. Ruff, supra; Sisk v.
Hurst, I W. Va. 53; and Ball v. Rawles, 93 Cal. 222; S. C.,
28 Pac. Rep. 937, which rests upon a mistaken view of Hahn
,v. Schmidt, 64 Cal. 284; S. C., 30 Pac. Rep. 818. All that
was decided in the lUtter case was, that when a complaint is
made before a justice, and he issues a warrant thereon under
.a mistaken conception of the law, the person who made the
.complaint is not liable, as the justice issued the warrant on his

TO A SUIT FOR MALICIOUS

PROSECUTION.

own re.qponsibility. This is a correct view of the law: Leigh
v. Webb, 3 Esp. 165; Cohen v. Morgan, 6 D. & R. 8; Carratt v. Morley, I Gale & D. 275; Teal v. Fissel, 28 Fed. Rep.
35 1; Newman v. Davis, 58 Iowa, 447; S. C., IO N.W. Rep. 852;
Smith v. Austin, 49 Mich. 286; but is a wholly different case
from the issuance of a warrant by a justice on request of the
complainant, after obtaining his advice. In the latter case the
complainant is active, in the former passive. Ball v. Rawles,
therefore, is of no authority.
There is, however, no good reason why the advice of a justice or magistrate, who is also an attorney, should not be a
defence; and this has been held to be the law: Turner v.
Dinnegar, 2o Hun (N. Y.), 465. This doctrine was denied
in Mark v. Hastings (Ala.), 13 So. Rep. 297, on the ground
that in such a case the advice was asked and given, not as an
attorney, but as a magistrate, and that "however learned in
the law, it would be an impolitic and unwarrantable extension
of the rule to allow the advice or opinion of a justice of the peace
in regard to the sufficiency of the grounds for the institution
of a prosecution before him." While this may be true, it does
not touch the point. The only question is whether the person
who advises is competent and disinterested ; and if so, it makes
no difference whether he is attorney, magistrate, or judge.
This question was very fully discussed in Monaghan v. Cox,
155 Mass. 487; S. C., 3o N. E. Rep. 467, where the magistrate was also an attorney. "Olmstead v. Partridge was
decided in i86o. Since that time the authority to issue
warrants for criminal offences has been. taken from the
ordinary justices of the peace and is fodged on officers
specially designated for the purpose, and in trial justices, and
the justices of police, district and municipal courts. A very
large majority of the gentlemen now having this authority
are members of the Bar, and all have been selected with care,
and are known to the community as wise and discreet men.
Besides this, they are disinterested and .independent and .not,
as was sometimes felt to be the case with justices of the peace
under the old system, under the control or influence of particular persons. No one expects that the old order of things
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will be reinstated, or that less care will in the future be exercised in the selection of the magistrates, to whom, under the
present system, the duty of receiving complaints is intrusted.
If then it is clear, that our magistrates of this class possess
the qualifications and are free from the disqualifications mentioned in the opinion of the court in Olmstead v. Partridge;
the same principles which led the court to its decision in that
case now require us to decide differently.

Upon the

question whether, under certain circumnstances stated, a formal
complaint ought to be made, and a warrant issued, we cannot
say that it is improper for such magistrates to give advice,
and it follows that no good reason now exists why in this
Commonwealth evidence that a complaint was made upon the
advice of such a magistrate should be inadmissible upon tht
question of probable cause."
This is true, so far as concerns the case in hand, and the
case of any magistrate or justice who is also an attorney; but
it cannot be held to apply to magistrates or justices who are
not learned in the law. As to them the old rule still applies.
And in any case the advice of a justice, who is not responsible
to any one for his action, ought not to be given the. same
effect as that of a regular attorney. This is acknowledged by
the court in Monaghan v. Cox, supra.
In any case, the advice of a layman, if honestly sought,
will go in mitigation of damages: Murphy v. Larson, 7711l.172.
I1. The advice of an attorney is by no means an absolute
justification; but merely evidence to go to thejury of the absence
of malice and the existence of probable cause. "It is not the
advice that rebuts the presumption of malice, but the innocence
of defendant's conduct, of which his seeking advice is merely
evidence. Whether the advice makes out a good defence or
not, depends on the good faith with which it is sought and
followed. Such good faith is shown by the candor, fullness
and fairness of the clients' statement, upon which the advice
was based, and its adequacy in those respects, whenever it is
disputed, is for the jury to determine upon all the evidence: "
Smith v. Walter, 125 Pa. 453; S. C., 23 W. N. C. 538;
17 AtI. Rep. 466; Lemay v. Williams, 32 Ark. i66;
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Skidmore v. Bricker, 77 Ill. 164; Fadner v. Filer, 27
Ill. App. 5o6; Smith v. Zent, 59 Ind. 362; McCarthy
v. Kitchen, 59 Ind. 50o; Lytton v. Baird, 95 Ind. 349;
Flora v. Russell (Ind.), the principal case, 37 N. E. Rep. 593 ;
Mesher v. Iddings, 72 Iowa, 553; Hall v. Kehoe, 8 N. Y.
Suppl. 176; Ramsey v. Arrott, 64 Tex. 320; Glasgow v.
Owen, 69 Tex. 167; S. C., 6 S. W. Rep. 527; Shannon v.
Jones, 76 Tex. i41; S. C., 13 S. W. Rep. 477. Accordingly, the conduct of the plaintiff must be free from any bad
faith. In the first place, he must have given to the attorney,
as the basis for his advice, a full and fair statement of the facts
of the case, or he will still be liable: Guthbert v. Galloway, 35
Fed. Rep. 466; Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason, 102; Bliss v. Wyman,
7 Cal. 257; Potter v. Seale, 8 Cal. 217; Aldridge v. Churchill, 28 Ind. 62 ; Scotten v. Longfellow, 40 Ind. 23 ; Paddock
v. Watts, Ii6 Ind. 146; S.C., I8 N. E. Rep. 518; Logan v.
Maytag, 57 Iowa, 107; Mesher v. Iddings, 72 Iowa, 553;
Schippel v. Norton, 38 Kans. 567; Cointement v. Cropper,
41 La. An. 303; S. C., 6 So. Rep. 127; Weil v. Israel, 42
La. An. 955; S. C., 8 So. Rep. 826; Wells v. Noyes, 12
Pick. 324; Donnelly v. Daggett, 145 Mass. 314; Stevens v.
Fassett, 27 Me. 266; Huntington v. Gault, 8I Mich. I44;
S. C., 45 N. W. Rep. 970; Baldwin v. Weed, 17 Wend. 224;
Davenport v. Lynch, 6 Jones N. C. L. 545; Ash v. Marlow,
20 Ohio, I I9; Walter v. Sample, 25 Pa. 275; Fisher v. Forrester, 33 Pa. 501 ; Emerson v. Cochran, III Pa. 619;'
Leahey v. March, i55 Pa. 458; S. C., 32 W. N. C. 292; 26
Atl. Rep. 7oi; Hall v. Hawkins, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 357;
Kendrick v. Cypert, io Humph. (Tenn.) 291; Forbes v.
Hagman, 75 Va. i68 ; Sherburn v. Rodman, 5' Wis. 474;
Palmer v. Broder, 78 Wis. 483; S.C., 47 N. W. Rep. 744.
It is therefore not enough to merely prove the consultation
with the attorney; the facts laid before him must also be
proved: Aldridge v. Churchill,'28 Ind. 62; Porter v. Knight,
63 Iowa, 365; Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason, 102.
A suppression of material facts will render the defendant
liable. "Any evasion or concealment by a prosecutor in his
statement of case to his counsel, or any failure on his part to
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make a full disclosure of all the facts within his knowledge
concerning it, will deprive him of the protection which advice
founded upon an honestfair and full presentation of the case
affords.
An incomplete and unfair statement warrants an
inference that the advice was sought as "a mere cover for
the prosecution, and an opinion based on such statement isan unsatisfactory reply to evidence of malice and want of
probable cause:" Barhight v. Tammany (Pa.), 28 At.
Rep. 135; Galloway v. Stewart, 49 Ind. 156; Stevens v.
Fassett, 27 Me. 266; Willard v. Holmes, 21 N. Y. Suppl.
998; S. C., 2 Misc. Rep. 303. Thus, defendant is liable if he
fail to state that property taken by plaintiff was taken openly and
under a claim of right: Roy v. Goings, 112 Ill. 656; that
the plaintiff requested him to examine the property alleged
to have been stolen, and that he refused: Norrell v. Vogel,
39 Minn. 107; S. C., 38 N. W. Rep. 705; or that there
are facts tending to exculpate the plaintiff: Jessup v. Whitehead (Colo.), 29 Pac. Rep. 916. The defendant will not be
exonerated if he" so exaggerate the facts as to mislead the
attorney: Flora v. Russell (Ind.), the principal case, 37 N. E.
Rep. 593. It is competent to ask the attorney, as an expert,
whether or not, if the -facts stated had been different in a
s.pecified particular from those stated by defendant, he would
have given the advice he did: Paddock v. Watts, 116 Ind.
136; S.C., 18 N.E. Rep. 518.
The defendant, however, is not bound to disclose all the
facts in the case, but only those which he knows, or might
have ascertained by reasonable diligence: Motes v. Bates,
8o Ala. 382; Wicker v. Hotchkiss, 62 Ill. 107; Manning vz.
Finn, 23 Neb. 511; R. R. v. Hunt, 59 Vt. 294. But a
failure to state facts exculpatory of plaintiff, which the defendant might have known by the slightest inquiry of persons
associated with himself in the transaction complained of, he
being in possession of information which would have put a
prudent man on inquiry respecting those facts, will make him
liable: Jessup v. Whitehead (Colo.), 29 Pac. Rep. 916. If,
however, the reputation of his informants for veracity is bad,
a failure to make inquiry about the latter will nbt remove the
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defendant from the protection of the rule, when there were no
known facts to arouse suspicion as to the truth of their statements: Jordan v. R. R., 8I Ala. 220; S. C., 8 So. Rep. 191.
The facts which the defendant is obliged to disclose are only
those which a man of ordinary intelligence is bound to knoware material: Peterson v. Toner, 8o Mich. 350; S.C., 45 N. W.
Rep. 346.
IV. The prosecution must also be carried on in good faith,.
after the advice has been given: Wells v. Noyes, 12 Pick. 324;Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn. 182; Ravenga v. Mackintosh, 2 B_
& C. 693. A prosecution to force collection of a debt is not
in good faith: Neufeld v. Rodeminiski (Ill.), 32 N. E. Rep.
913; nor if caused by passion and a desire to injure theplaintiff: Fugate v. Miller, 109 Mo. 281; S. C., 19 S. W.
Rep. 71 ; Sharpe v. Johnston, 76 Mo. 66o; nor if the defendant did not in fact believe the plaintiff guilty: Center vSpring, 2 Iowa, 393; Johnson v. Miller, 82 Iowa, 693; nor
had reason to believe him so: Brewer v. Jacobs, 22 Fed.
Rep. 217.
V. The defendant, if he acts in good faith, is not liable for
the error of the attorney in advising the prosecution: Stone v.
Swift, 4 Pick. 389; Wells v. Noyes, 12 Pick. 324; Hall v.
Suydam, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 83; Walter v. Sample, 25 Pa. 275;
Richardson v.Virtue, 72 Hun (N.Y.) 2o8. But see Hewlett v.
Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 277; and Hall v. Hawkins, 5 Humph. 357..
VI. There has been much dispute as to the proper applica-tion of the evidence of advice. Some authorities hold" that it:
goes to the question of malice only: Brewer v. Jacobs, 22.
Fed. Rep. 217; Wright v. Hanna, 98 Ind. 217; Ramsey v..
Arrott, 64 Tex. 320. Others claim that it relates only to
probable cause: Genevey v. Edwards (Minn.), 56 N. W. Rep.
578; Sharpe v. Johnson, 59 Mo. 557; Hall v. Kehoe, &
N. Y. Suppl. 176. The better opinion, however, is that which
makes advice evidence of both want of malice and the existence
of probable cause: Wilkinson v. Arnold, I I Ind. 45; Smith
v. Zent, 59 Ind. 362; McCarthy v. Kitchen, 59 Ind. 500;
Gould v. Gardner, 8 La. An. I I ; Phillips v. Bonham, I6 La.
An. 387; Monaghan v. Cox, 155 Mass. 487; S. C., 3o N. E.
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Rep. 467; Thurston v. Wright, 77 Mich. 96; Shannon v.
Jones, 76 Tex. 141 ; S. C., 13 S. W. Rep: 477; Hurlbut v.
Boaz (Tex.), 23 S. W. Rep. 446. The question of the effect
of this evidence is solely for the jury: Smith v. Walter, 125
Pa. 453; S. C., 23 W. N. C., 538; 17 Atl. Rep. 466.
VII. The whole subject is very well summed in the following extract from the opinion of the court in Stevens v. Fassett,
27 Me. 266, 283: "If a person with an honest wish to ascertain whether certain facts will authorize a suit or a criminal
prosecution, lays all such facts before one learned in the law,
and solicits his deliberate opinion thereon, and. the advice
obtained is favorable to the suit or prosecution, which is thereupon commenced, it will certainly go far, in the absence of
other facts, to show probable cause, and to negative malice.
But if it appears that he withheld material facts, within his
knowledge, or which, in the exercise of common prudence, he
might have known; or if it appears that he was influenced by
passion or a desire to injure the other party, and especially if
he received froni another, learned in the law, whose counsel
he sought, advice of a contrary character upon the same
question, the opinion which he invokes in defence, ought not
to avail him, and it is well understood that it cannot be a
protection."
[For a collection of cases on this subject, see 14 Am. & Eng.
Enc. of Law, 52, etc.]
R. D. S.

